Even if the present civil war has caught the West by surprise, whoever emerges victorious is likely to face a West-orchestrated destabilization in the near future.
As we witness the chaos unfolding in Sudan this April, Donald Trump briefly comes to mind. However, let’s give some background before getting there.
Sudan, like many other third-world countries, has had a poor human rights record since its creation. The USA probably only noticed this in 2011 (charged by the Arab Spring, one guesses) and began pushing for a referendum in Sudan. This referendum eventually materialized after much bloodshed, riots, targeted killings, serious civil disorder, and several rounds of vilification of the Sudanese government – some analysts point out –following Khartoum’s increasing oil supplies to China and an apprehension of subsequent consolidation in Sino-Sudanese relations.
An anecdote here: One day, during that time, I located an old batch mate of mine – a Kargil veteran and decorated army officer – deputed as part of an armed ‘peace’ mission to Sudan. While chatting with him about the situation there in general, he replied that he was somewhere in the south of Sudan (the main fighting those days was in the Darfur region). To my question about the same, his brief reply was, “We are guarding ‘Uncle’s oilfields.”
With South Sudan and the oil fields secured after 2011, the West reduced their active involvement; they made sure that the state stayed afloat through aid, even as South Sudan quickly descended to be among the poorest countries in the world. The sanctions that applied to Sudan stopped applying to South Sudan. And China still managed a fair share of Sudanese crude, but Japan, Italy, and Singapore quickly became their fastest-growing partners.
Over time, Sudan developed decent relations with Russia. Russian exports to Sudan, Sudanese students in Russia, Sudan recognizing Crimea as a part of Russia, and general diplomatic relations between the two nations were the order of the times. Donald Trump’s team correctly identified Sudan as one of the gray spots in the overall scope of a balance within the Middle East and Horn of Africa. They resolved this adroitly. Trump arguably had the best relations with Russia that any US president has ever had, and this lent his stature a major boost when he tried to insert himself into the Middle East equation. By the time he got Israel-UAE-Bahrain to sign the Abraham Accord, he had established an excellent relationship with Mohammed Bin Salman, and Washington appeared keen to push for more mutually beneficial commercial relationships over endless sectarian conflict in the region. Soon Sudan and Morocco – presumably influenced by MBS – became signatories to the Abraham Accord.
What good Donald Trump achieved in the sphere of international relations during his blink-and-miss presidency was summarily undone by his successor; the Middle East being one of them. Joe Biden quickly managed to antagonize Russia, China, and MBS, and that threw the entire Middle East equation off balance.
Across the Red Sea, Sudan decided to move ahead with a Russian naval base – one in the pipeline in 2019, one that even witnessed a derailment following a military coup in 2021. A formal announcement about the plan was made on February 12, 2023. The deal is in the review stage, needing parliamentary approval – one that does not exist in Sudan at the moment. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov’s visit in February was a step ahead in that direction; there was an agreement on the terms and conditions to set up an initial logistics center for the Russian Navy in Sudan.
As one would expect in such cases, this was preceded by a warning from the US on September 28, 2022: “All countries have a sovereign right to decide which other countries to partner with, but these choices have consequences, of course.” Now, barely 60 days after Lavrov’s visit and the joint announcement of a consolidation in Russo-Sudanese relations, Sudan has suddenly descended into a civil war of sorts.
Is that the ‘consequence’ that the USA warned Sudan about?
To be honest, the signs are still not clear. There are no verified updates hinting at indirect western intervention. There is this bit of news about the US housing 16,000 American citizens and officials in Sudan – an alarmingly overpopulated outpost considering US ties with Sudan (the US sent its first ambassador to Sudan in Aug 2022 – less than a year ago – after a gap of 25 years!). Apparently, they had plenty of catching up to do – hence that kind of a batch strength. However, they were rudely disrupted by the present conflict, and a chunk of them had to hastily depart, shutting the embassy down.
Western press coverage tracks a portion of the frustration. CNN has taken to calling both Burhan and Dagalo ‘warlords’ – which is unlike most of their conflict coverage, where they always have a ‘hero’ and a ‘villain’ – a sign that the USA has probably not succeeded in establishing friendly ties with either of them. Cameron Hudson, a former CIA analyst, has rued the US mistake of not dealing with them while there was time – perhaps another one of Biden’s sloppy legacies.
What might that mean? Sudan, by its structure, is a weak state. It has been balkanized in the recent past. Even if the present civil war has caught the West by surprise, whoever between Burhan and Dagalo emerges is likely to face a West-orchestrated destabilization in the near future. After all, while Burhan agrees to a Russian naval base, Dagalo allegedly remains hand in gloves with Russian companies on the Sudanese gold mining front; both of them presently ‘villains’ in the eyes of the West.
As far as resources for a color revolution go, it would do well to remember that out of the 16,000 American citizens in Sudan during the start of the conflict, many have ‘chosen’ to stay behind. They are mostly dual citizens – the native torchbearers of woke Western liberalism, in all likelihood. There is no knowing what tomorrow brings.
(Arindam Mukherjee is a geopolitical analyst and the author of JourneyDog Tales, The Puppeteer, and A Matter of Greed.)